Canterbury Model United Nations (2019)

UNHRC

HUMAN RIGHTS COUNCIL

THE ISSUE OF FOREIGN INTERVENTION IN CONFLICTS

<u>Dear Distinguish Delegates,</u>

I am absolutely delighted to be welcoming you to Canterbury Model United Nations 2019 and the Human Right Council. My name is Mohammad Abid Qayumi and I will be your Chair this year, this will be my 26th time attending Model UN conference and my 23rd as a member of Executive Board, I have been in different committees such as a General Assembly, Economic and Financial Committee, and the Human Right Council, Security Council, and last Model UN I was the Vice Chair of the Security Council.

I begin from the Kabul city of Afghanistan, where I was an active member of my society Model UN team for three years. Now, I am a sophomore at Dunya University majoring in Master in Public Administration. Outside of the classroom, I'm a member of the editorial board for many Model United Nations Conferences. In my free time, I am an AIESECer, I love going to concerts, traveling, playing card games (and winning), and GYM Bodybuilding

One of my favorite parts of being EB is Canterbury Model United Nations, which is witnessing the engagement of topics that you have given, showing a long-term commitment to research and showcase your skills as delegates. The topic you are investigating is set before the committee, and it is about the representative of that moment in history. I agree with this because the revolution has been revised in particular by the revolution, but the invasion will occur when our committee is held.

This will definitely discuss the immediate issue and give you the opportunity to think on your feet and show your skills as delegates. The guide appears to be the intended range to offer you a platform for you to start your own research on our topic However, I encourage you to continue your research process; do not let your studies of these events end. If you have any questions, whether you are reading about the research, or about the committee itself, Please contact me by email.

Good luck with your research!

Sincerely,
Mohammad Abid Qayumi
Chairperson, Human Right Council
Canterbury Model United Nations 2019
mabidqayumi@gmail.com

Table Content

Introduction

UNHRC:

The United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC) is a United Nations body whose mission is to promote and protect human rights around the world, The UNHRC has 47 members elected for staggered three-year terms on a regional group basis and the 38th session of the UNHRC began June 18, 2018. It ended on July 7, 2018, the headquarters of UNHRC is in Geneva, Switzerland, The UNHRC investigates allegations of breaches of human rights in UN member states, and addresses important thematic human rights issues such as freedom of association and assembly, freedom of expression, freedom of belief and religion, women's rights, LGBT rights, and the rights of racial and ethnic minorities.

The UNHRC was established by the UN General Assembly on March 15, 2006 (by resolution A/RES/60/251) to replace the UN Commission on Human Rights (UNCHR, herein CHR) that had been strongly criticized for allowing countries with poor human rights records to be members. UN Secretaries General Kofi Annan and Ban Ki-moon, former president of the council Doru Costea, the European Union, Canada, and the United States have accused the UNHRC of focusing disproportionately on the Israeli–Palestinian conflict, and many allege an anti-Israel bias – the Council has resolved more resolutions condemning Israel than the rest of the world combined. The UNHRC works closely with the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) and engages the UN's special procedures, The UNHRC has 47 members, selected each year by the UN General Assembly for staggered three-year terms on a regional group basis, No member may occupy a seat for more than two consecutive three-year terms. The seats are distributed among the UN's regional groups as follows: 13 for Africa, 13 for Asia, six for Eastern Europe, eight for Latin America and the Caribbean (GRULAC), and seven for the Western European and Others Group (WEOG).

Foreign Intervention:

Interventionism is a policy of non-defensive (proactive) activity undertaken by a nation-state, or other geo-political jurisdiction of a lesser or greater nature, to manipulate an economy and/or society. The most common applications of the term are for economic interventionism (a state's intervention in its own economy), and foreign interventionism (a state's intervention in the affairs of another nation as part of its foreign policy) the political government of a state decide actions of foreign intervention and foreign policy, Political interventionism can include methods such as sanctions on a foreign economy or international trade with similar results to protectionism, or other international sanctions through international cooperation decisions guarding international law or global justice. Political support or political capital, such as nationalism or ethnic conflict also decide foreign intervention actions such as occupation, nation-building and national security policies.

The objectives of a policy for foreign intervention can be philosophical, religious or scientific based on the different ideological foundations supporting the policy, Example of objectives are national security, support for world government, scientific systemic concern of systemic bias in international relations theory, policy of balancing as a goal for balance of power in international relations or balance of threat, Efforts in foreign intervention may include diplomacy to dispute resolution. The involved parties in a conflict may negotiate a peace treaty or other treaties. A state may operate as a protecting power on behalf of other states, offering foreign intervention capabilities. This is usually done by a neutral country, International conventions may be reached by an international consensus. Ideas of equal power relationship and pacifism are sometimes used in diplomacy. Towards the end of the Cold War there was a public rationale and reasoning for a peace dividend with economic benefits of a decrease in defense spending.

Statement of the Issue

Foreign intervention in conflicts has received significant attention in the last 20 years. Scholars have initially considered the sources for these interventions through instrumental and affective factors, though a better classification involves grouping these motives between domestic and international factors. The former category assumes that a third state's internal politics best explain motives of intervention, and that domestic groups within the state have the greatest impact on foreign policy decision making. Theories based on domestic explanations assume that domestic politics greatly matter in the formulation of states' decisions to intervene or not in ethnic conflicts elsewhere.

As for the external explanations, scholars share a common assertion that the international environment is the central determinant explaining third state intervention. These explanations focus on the impact of institutions and international norms on the international relations of ethnic conflicts. In addition to these approaches, this area of research still contains many issues left unaddressed, such as how interference from outside might affect an ethnic conflict, and what forms of analysis might be used to study foreign interventions. Scholars have applied both quantitative and qualitative techniques, and the diaspora literature stands out for relying almost exclusively on case studies and on very notable cases. Otherwise, the rest of the work in this field follows the current standards by using a mixture of case studies and quantitative analyses depending on the questions in play.

The past two decades have seen a great deal of work and much progress made in understanding the conditions under which outsiders will get involved in an ethnic conflict and to what effect. Yet, there is still a considerable work to do. Here, we raise a few potential directions for the next decade of work on the causes and effects of intervention into ethnic conflict, First, in most of this work, the combatants are largely seen as the objects of intervention with most of the causal weight placed on either international factors or the domestic politics of the intervening country. We need to take seriously the efforts made by the ethnic groups and governments as they try to encourage or discourage external involvement. The first efforts here have focused on how ethnic groups appeal to outsiders (Bob 2005; Saideman et al. 2005), but governments can play a role as well.

It should be clear by now that some groups gain more support than others in the same state and that a group may attract more assistance in one country than its kin in a neighboring state. Moreover, assistance varies over time, such as support for the Kurds of Iran and Iraq, but much of the work thus far tends to treat intervention more as constant. Work that focuses on timing or shifts in support may provide more insight into the forces that influence intervention, Similarly, many ethnic groups have multiple organizations competing to represent them. While the Palestinians are the obvious case of such a group, their situation is far from unique, We need to take seriously not only why some ethnic groups receive more support or assistance from difference sources, but also why some organizations are more or less successful in attracting outside help compared to others, despite all representing the same ethnic group.

Essentially, this is a call to take seriously the variation that exists between, among, and within ethnic groups in their strategies and their outcomes. The first generation focused the larger forces shaping patterns of intervention, but focusing on the variations may provide us with the leverage we need to determine the drivers of intervention, second, nearly all the work on duration – the causes of the persistence and termination of conflict – has focused on civil wars. Some attention has been paid to whether ethnic and non-ethnic civil wars are distinct, but we need to do more to figure out whether intervention affects different kinds of ethnic conflict in different ways. Secessionist civil wars may last longer – is this because there is less intervention? Do ethnic revolts tend to produce overwhelming outside assistance on one side of the conflict, producing shorter conflicts?

Interactions may exist between the type of conflict and the involvement of outsiders, producing shorter or longer periods of violence. As mentioned earlier, we need to take seriously whether different types of ethnic strife have distinct dynamics. If not, that would still be an important finding, finally, scholars are only now taking seriously how different forms of intervention may produce different kinds of outcome (Regan and Aysegul 2006). This move to taking more seriously the method of involvement may again provide us with more variation and, therefore, more leverage to understand the sources and the effects of intervention, Of course, in suggesting these future courses of research, we do not mean to imply that the older questions have been decidedly answered. There is still plenty of debate about the sources and constraints of intervention, but considering the variations in the objects of our study – groups, organizations, assistance – may help to clarify what we have learned and what we still need to understand.

Analysis Foreign Intervention in Conflicts

We face many foreign policy decisions how to respond to the fighting in Afghanistan, Lebanon, Nicaragua, Salvador, Angola, Kampuchea, the Philippines and soon, perhaps, South Africa that involve the legality of intervening in a civil war. The international law journals are full of scholarly discussions on this subject. They are hard for non-scholars to follow. They disagree sharply, as scholars are wont to do, in their argumentation and conclusions. For readers who are not scholars of international law, this article tries to explain how the rules have evolved, where they now stand, and how they might be clarified to relieve the rising tension between the principle of nonintervention and the human rights of self-determination and open democratic elections.

Does it matter whether our military interventions in civil wars, or those of the Soviet bloc, violate international law? Only the U.N. Security Council has the legal power to enforce international law, and it in fact has no such power against the Soviet Union or the United States if either chooses to exercise its right of veto. The columnist George Will has suggested that Americans ought to care less about whether we have the legal right to intervene than whether intervention in a particular civil war is the right thing to do, But it does matter whether our actions comply with international law. It matters precisely because we are a practicing democracy with both philosophical and geopolitical reasons to encourage the democratic aspirations of all peoples. Democracy cannot flourish in a lawless climate; it depends on widely accepted principles of law for its survival. That is obvious with respect to national law. It is equally important with respect to international law, especially our treaty commitments under the charters of the United Nations and the Organization of American States. No democratic nation least of all a democratic superpower can afford to act in a manner that admittedly flouts international law. To sustain free-world support of our leadership, our actions must be confined.

The Arab Spring initially brought hope for change in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), but the term soon became a misnomer. After the protests toppled several autocratic governments, many people recognized that the transition would be prolonged and difficult. In several countries, hope quickly turned into despair as political violence escalated. Yet, even as these events unfolded, the world was unprepared for the gravity of the post-Arab Spring civil wars. The consequences of these wars were simply unimaginable at the time. They brought about devastation and suffering on a scale unseen since World War II. How could this happen? Before the Arab Spring, except for Yemen, the countries in the Middle East and North Africa did not fit the profile of countries at risk for civil war. Following independence, most Arab states made substantial socioeconomic progress, nearly all of them achieved middle-income status, reduced extreme poverty and inequality, and improved access to basic services. Importantly, the Arab Spring protests were initially peaceful and drew broad-based support due to widespread dissatisfaction with the erosion in the living standards of the middle class, the shortage of formal sector jobs, and elite capture.


Figure 1: Non-neutral and non-humanitarian foreign military intervention, polarization, and conflict by region (per country per period)
Data sources: IMI data (Pearson and Baumann, 1993) for foreign military interventions of non-neutral and non-humanitarian type; PRIO for conflict incidence; L'Etat des religions dans le monde and The Statesman's Yearbook for religious polarization; WCE for ethnic polarization. Religious and ethnic polarization indexes, calculated following Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005), emphasize group sizes and assume that all groups are equidistant from each other.

In "The New Arab Wars: Uprisings and Anarchy in the Middle East" Mark Lynch draws attention to the role of foreign interventions in the aftermath of the initial protests. He argues that regional powers used the Arab Spring as an opportunity to increase their influence in the region. A multitude of stakeholders from multiple countries intervened, in an uncoordinated fashion, where the Arab Spring uprisings were intense. Some of these interventions had humanitarian goals, but others did not, and provided military support to different sides in the conflict. The objectives of interventions also changed quickly as the situation on the ground evolved. Since interventions were often not neutral and favored different rebel factions, they created conditions for the competitive arming of rebels and financial support for rebel groups, increasing the risk of conflict intensification.

In a recent paper, we explore the link between non-neutral and non-humanitarian foreign military interventions, identity-based polarization, and civil conflict. Panel data for 138 countries tell us that for decades—from 1960 to 2005—nearly all MENA countries have been targets of this type of military intervention, defined as the "movement of regular troops or forces of one country inside another, in the context of some political issue or dispute." Before the Arab Spring, the incidence of conflict and military interventions in the Middle East and North Africa far exceeded that in other regions (Figure 1). The region with the second highest incidence of such interventions, sub-Saharan Africa, had half the prevalence of that observed in MENA. Meanwhile, at the beginning of the 1960s, identity-based polarization along religious or ethnic lines was not higher in MENA than elsewhere in the world, In our paper, we argue that military interventions that are non-neutral and non-humanitarian are problematic because they alter the probability of winning of the warring factions, either through direct military assistance or through incentives to raise war-related resources, or both. This in turn intensifies identity-based polarization by stoking inter-group antagonism through alienation and increases the probability of conflict. In addition, this type of intervention has the potential to increase the intensity of fighting and the associated casualties, as external support decreases the rebels' dependence on local support and therefore their incentives to protect the local population.

The case of Lebanon illustrates this issue. Prior to the civil war, interventions started when the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), after getting pushed out of Jordan following the 'Black September' of 1970, established a presence in Lebanon, disturbing the sectarian balance in the country. After 1970, interventions in Lebanon supported the Shia minority, which was pushed out of Southern Lebanon into the urban peripheries of Beirut. These interventions occurred in the context of shifting population weights and led to a struggle for political power, which resulted in a split into a pro-Nasser Sunni Muslim camp and pro-Western Christian camp and growing intergroup alienation, which increased religious and sectarian polarization. Eventually, a confrontation between the Lebanese Forces (LF) and the Lebanese National Movement (LNM) erupted and sectarian violence escalated, leading to further interventions in a vicious cycle that grew into a large-scale conflict.


Figure 2: Marginal effect of non-neutral and non-humanitarian intervention by region
Source: Abu Bader and Ianchovichina (2018) Journal of Development Economics (forthcoming). Note: MENA=1 denotes the effect for the countries in the Middle East and North Africa; MENA=0 denotes the effect for countries in the rest of the world.

This research provides evidence that non-humanitarian and non-neutral interventions intensify religious polarization through their effect on inter-sectarian alienation, increasing the risk of high-intensity conflict in MENA, but not in the rest of the world (Figure 2). In other words, even though religious polarization was not high at the beginning of the estimation period, foreign military interventions have a divisive effect on the behavior of rival sectarian groups. They increased inter-group alienation and therefore identity-based polarization along ethnic and religious lines. These findings are consistent with those of Kristian Skrede Gleditsch, who argues that transnational linkages and the attributes of neighboring states can affect the risk of conflict in a country. He finds that the risk of civil war is substantially higher in countries with many transborder groups on its territory or in countries neighboring fragile or authoritarian states.

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Source: Abu Bader and Ianchovichina (2018) Journal of Development Economics (forthcoming). Note: MENA=1 denotes the effect for the countries in the Middle East and North Africa; MENA=0 denotes the effect for countries in the rest of the world, Non-neutral and non-humanitarian foreign military interventions are only one factor among many that could inflame sectarian conflict. Domestic policies in many MENA states, such as repression and the use of sectarianism to prevent the emergence of cross-sectarian opposition fronts or to contain protests, have also stoked sectarianism, Finally, it is worth stressing that not all types of foreign military interventions increase the risk of conflict. We find no such effect in the case of neutral and humanitarian military interventions, which are evenly distributed across regions and are much less prevalent in MENA than the non-neutral and non-humanitarian ones (see Figure 3). The unintended consequences of the latter provide one explanation for the "Arab Spring paradox" of peaceful protests in middle-income countries leading to sectarian conflict and violent civil wars.

Figure 3: Distribution of military intervention frequency by type and region (per country per period)
Data source: IMI data (Pearson and Baumann, 1993).

Relevant International Actions

The Russian foreign minister Sergei Lavrov, in a recent interview, produced a piece of paper from his pocket with a quote from Alexander Gorchakov, a 19th-century Russian prince who served as the tsar's foreign minister. "Foreign intervention into domestic matters," intoned Lavrov to Susan Glasser, Foreign Policy's editor-in-chief, "is unacceptable. It is unacceptable to use force in international relations, especially by the countries who consider themselves leaders of civilisation." As ministers in the US, UK and France push for greater intervention to prevent Syria's bloodshed, Lavrov's remark stands not only as a rebuke to the ambitions of those who would do more to stop Bashar al-Assad, but to an entire doctrine of humanitarian intervention – Responsibility to Protect (R2P) – whose future is uncertain.

Drawn up by the UN in response to the wars of the 1990s, not least in Bosnia and Rwanda, which both saw atrocities that would be defined as genocidal, R2P was adopted by the UN as a "norm" for dealing with conflicts where civilians were under attack in 2005, Its language has been referred to – or invoked directly – to justify the French interventions in Ivory Coast in 2011, in Mali earlier this year, and the Nato-led no-fly zone imposed over Libya during the conflict that led to the fall of the Gaddafi regime. But now, facing precisely the kind of terrible conflict the doctrine was designed to mitigate or largely prevent, the brave new UN model for protecting civilian victims of war has stalled, As both the US and the UK's defence secretaries indicated last week that they are examining different military options, a debate has erupted over the future of military interventions on humanitarian grounds, and their claimed necessity.

Those arguments have ranged from the moral to the utilitarian and the self-interested – witness the argument that by not acting the US, in particular, damages its future "credibility" when it threatens the use of force. They have been made amid a rethinking of how these military interventions are actually conducted, from the large-scale operations and expensive, flawed, nation-building efforts that were seen in Iraq and Afghanistan to "lighter footprint" interventions seen recently in Libya, Mali and Ivory Coast, Opponents of different kinds of intervention in Syria have cited complex practical problems, including how to arm a rebel side numbering a significant minority of jihadist fighters. But one of the biggest stumbling blocks has been how R2P itself has been applied in the recent past – not least in Libya, Gareth Evans, Australia's former foreign minister, is also an international lawyer jointly responsible for drafting the document taken on by the UN in 2005. He is among those who admit that a doctrine designed to give meaning to the promises of "never again" made after the Holocaust and the killing fields of Cambodia, Bosnia and Rwanda has met difficulties. "What punctured the optimism that the world might be on its way to ending internal mass atrocity crimes once and for all," said Evans, "is the controversy that erupted in the security council in 2011 about the way the norm was applied in the Nato-led intervention in Libya, and the paralysis that in turn generated in the council's response to Syria." Last year Evans spoke of a collapse of international consensus that had led to "paralysis" over Syria.

"I believe that – like most midlife crises – this one will prove survivable … but I can't pretend that its full realisation will not be a work in progress for a long time to come." The deliberations over Libya, Evans argues, marked the "high water mark" of R2P – seeing the new norm referred to in two UN security council resolutions authorising "all necessary means" in the conflict. But the subsequent "backlash" is still being felt today, "The concern was about what came after when it became rapidly apparent [to Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa] that the three permanent council-member states driving the intervention [the US, UK and France, or "P3"] would settle for nothing less than regime change, and do whatever it took to achieve that, "Particular concerns were that the interveners rejected ceasefire offers that may have been serious, struck fleeing personnel that posed no immediate risk to civilians and locations that had no obvious military significance [like the compound in which Gaddafi relatives were killed] and, more generally, supported the rebel side in what rapidly became a civil war, ignoring the very explicit arms embargo in the process."

For Russia, Libya provided confirmation of its objections to R2P in the first place. For other countries such as South Africa, which had backed the principle of a new norm for intervention to prevent atrocities, the use of R2P for regime change in Libya – and the refusal of the P3 to report on the progress of the operation and its new parameters – were seen as betrayal, Jennifer Walsh, professor of international relations at Oxford University who has studied the development of R2P, agrees with Evans's analysis. But she also identifies a "moral hazard" inherent in R2P – that it can create a perception in conflicts that a rebel force may be only a regime-sponsored atrocity away from international interveners coming to its aid. The incentive for rebels to find a negotiated solution is thus reduced, As

Walsh points out, the suspicion that recent interventions have been too easily dominated by the agenda of the US, Britain and France has led to a push-back, led by Brazil.

The Brazilians and others are seeking to insist that any future military interventions on humanitarian grounds authorised by the UN should be guided both by a "prudential" assessment of the practicality of achieving the desired outcome in complex conflicts and informed by a mechanism for transparent, real-time reporting of the progress of operations to council members, to prevent resolutions being used as blank cheques by the P3 countries, This leaves the question of what the international community could do if it were proved definitively that chemical weapons had been used by the Assad regime in Syria, evidence that the British and US governments were backing away from last week, Some US officials in private have suggested that at best any change in policy would see the provision of small arms to the "right rebels" in groups not tainted by association with jihadist elements, an even lighter footprint than the intervention in Libya. Others, including senators – such as John McCain, and analysts, have been calling for full-blown intervention. Options that have been mooted range from air strikes, to no-fly zones, the creation of safe havens and humanitarian corridors, and even a Bosnian-style soft partition of the country.

The Lib Dem peer, Paddy Ashdown, who was a soldier in Northern Ireland and then high representative in Bosnia after the war there, disagrees that Libya set a damaging precedent, but adds it would be "folly" to intervene in Syria or lift the EU arms embargo, "R2P was in some respects a way of legitimising the intervention in Kosovo. I thought it would remain an aspiration but the effect of Libya was to turn from being a collection of words into being a precedent. It remains, however a principle subject to the will of the powerful to enforce it, Ashdown believes, too, that the more limited intervention in Libya – despite the country's post-Gaddafi unrest and political instability – remains a far better model than the occupation of Iraq, leaving Libyans in charge of their own destiny.
"It was not perfect but it was far less of a mess than Iraq."

Nonetheless, he argues forcefully that, even with the existence of R2P, a key test for intervention is whether it is both practically applicable or whether it will do more harm than good, "One of the key lessons of interventions is the unintended consequences that follow," he adds. Ashdown warns: "There has been a tendency to see Syria in simplistic black and white – powerless civilians against a brutal dictator – without trying to understand the wider regional tension involved." Echoing Ashdown last week was Daniel C Kurtzer, a former US ambassador to Egypt and to Israel, writing in the New York Times. "Before making a momentous decision on intervention – especially if the president is considering unilateral intervention – we ought to first do serious diplomacy to see whether an international consensus can be reached on the question of intervention …

"Indeed, the Syria crisis presents an opportunity to turn away from unilateralism and to adopt instead a more strategic, multilateral approach to resolving international crises."

An Australian UN soldier carries a Hutu orphan child whose mother was killed in south-western Rwanda in 1995.

The Effect of Foreign Intervention on Somali Conflict in Mogadishu--Somalia

It was the Spanish-American War at the end of the 19th century that ushered us somewhat reluctantly onto the world stage; even as it was going on, there was an enormous debate which involved President McKinley at the White House, among others, as to whether the United States would be a liberating or an occupying power. And in the end it was decided that we would keep the Philippines, we would not liberate them, in fact until 1946. (RICHARD NORTON SMITH) Repeatedly in the first half of the 20th century, American presidents of both parties sent Marines throughout the western hemisphere in particular — usually for economic interests, It was sometimes hard to tell whether American foreign policy was being made at the State Department or the United Fruit Company, which was known as "the Octopus" by Latinos, All of that began to change, intervention in fact was redefined with the advent of the Cold War, the creation of the CIA, instead of the Marines storming the beaches we had covert operations; Guatemala in 1953; in Iran we put the shah back on the Peecock throne. So I think when we're talking about intervention, we want to be very careful not to limit it to traditional military operations, MARGARET WARNER: Professor Chace, given that we have a long and rich history of intervention, but what about really military invasion as opposed to covert operations, would you say there's a long history, even if you define it by the military, as a military assault

JAMES CHACE: Of course there have been direct military assaults as well with the aim of changing regime. For example, Wilson sent in 1914, I believe, troops into Mexico to change the regime. He failed to do so, by the way, but he certainly tried to. Regime changes were made a number of times, in order to, by sending troops in, sending Marines in, in order to try to make a regime responsive to economic needs, to be, in other words, stable. More recently, however, of course, we have sent troops into Panama, roughly 30,000 troops out in the Panama Canal zone in to Panama itself to arrest Noriega, which we succeeded in doing and therefore to change the regime. We, of course, sent troops into Haiti, also to change the regime. And we might very well have kept troops in Somalia, also to change the regime. So we have certainly used military action in order to do so. In fact, we also sent troops during the Gulf War under President Bush's father. And the aim really was to change the regime in Iraq — to get Saddam Hussein out.

However, PHILIP ZELIKOW: There is a long history here. What's different this time is that the reasons for considering American intervention are dramatically different. In the past, we've intervened for regional stability, for reasons of human rights, because we thought there might be an indirect threat of the United States. Here the rationale is that if we don't intervene, a country may develop weapons of mass destruction that might be used directly against America or one of its friends. Now, that's different. The only precedent I can think of that's directly on point is an invasion that didn't happen. It was President Kennedy's decision to invade Cuba if diplomacy failed to get Soviet missiles off that island.

And he was quite prepared to first launch a major air strike and then if necessary invade that island rather than let America tolerate the threat he thought would be posed by weapons of mass destruction there. And in a way that's more analogous to the kind of threat that's motivating consideration of this possible intervention against Iraq. In Africa, Foreign Intervention is divided into seven case studies overall, with all regions of Africa covered; interventions from former Colonial powers, as well as the Soviet Union and United States predominate (China features also, although to a much lesser extent). Following an overview of 'Nationalism, decolonization and the Cold War, 1945–1991', chapters follow on 'Egypt and Algeria: radical nationalism, nonalignment, and external intervention in North Africa, 1952–1973'; 'The Congo Crisis, 1960–1965'; 'Portugal's African Empire, 1961–1975'; 'White-Minority Rule in Southern Africa, 1960–1990';'Conflict in the Horn, 1952–1993'; 'France's private African domain, 1947–1991'; and 'From the Cold War to the War on Terror (1991–2010)'. Early on, Schmidt notes cautiously that 'governments are not sentient beings with desires, will and the capacity to act.

Yet the need for shorthand sometimes leads to personification of political structures and the occasional reference to governments as actors' (p. 3). Caveats in the author's introduction 'governments are not monolithic'; 'foreign intervention cannot occur without internal collaboration' – are too often forgotten, however, as an attempt is made to cover a large breath of time and space in a short, readable text that is simultaneously appealing to an academic audience and a more general reader. The balance is clearly skewed the way of the latter and as a result, a formatting issue comes to form an increasingly misguided element of the text's construction and overall planning: minimal footnoting, with a focus on 'suggested reading' sections at the end of each case study. Whilst eschewing overlong footnotes can sometimes be a positive element of a text (as the book's foreword from William Minter puts it, trying to pay 'due attention to nuance without getting bogged down in detailed narratives and academic disputes' in Schmidt's text their absence is misguided. It is often within the suggested reading sections themselves that certain viewpoints and elements of given case studies – and in many cases, important rejoinders and caveats – have been omitted. As the text progresses, it is clear that a reconsideration of this decision could have added significantly to the text for it is within these sections that many of the nuances of Schmidt's arguments and thinking are lost. Similarly, it is evident that reducing the number of case studies may well have offered greater comparative worth and room to expand on themes and issues that the text as a whole is trying to speak to.

Ultimately, the nuance and layers of analysis are often greater in the suggested readings than in the case studies themselves. [accessed 9 October 2014] In the context Somalia intervention, the downfall of President Siad Barre in January 1991 resulted in a power struggle and clan clashes in many parts of Somalia. In November, the most intense fighting since January broke out in the capital, Mogadishu, between two factions C one supporting Interim President Ali Mahdi Mohamed and the other supporting the Chairman of the United Somali Congress, General Mohamed Farah Aided.

Since then, fighting persisted in Mogadishu and spread throughout Somalia, with heavily armed elements controlling various parts of the country. Some declared alliance with one or the other of the two factions, while others did not. Numerous marauding groups of bandits added to the problem, U.S. President George H.W. Bush, in his last weeks in office, proposed to the United Nations that American combat troops be sent to Somalia to protect aid workers. The UN accepted Bush's proposal, and on December 9, 1992, a force of about 25,000 U.S. troops began to arrive in Somalia. (Britannica.com, and united nation)

Imperialism, Intervention, "War On Terror" Detonate In Mogadishu

Bloc Positions

Blocs:

- **Western**
- **Former Soviet**
- **African**
- **Middle Eastern**
- **Latin American**

Western: The Western bloc refers during the Cold War to the United States and NATO allies against the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact. These are known as the Eastern Bloc. Governments and the press of the Western bloc tend to describe themselves as "the free world" or "the western world," while the eastern bloc is often called the "communist world."

During the Cold War, non-communist countries in Europe were called "Western Europe," but in the context of modern times, it is a mere geographical term.

NATO

- Belgium
- Canada
- Denmark
- France
- West Germany (from 1955)
- Greece (from 1952)
- Iceland
- Italy
- Luxembourg
- Netherlands
- Norway
- Portugal
- Spain (from 1982)
- Turkey (from 1952)
- United Kingdom
- United States

ANZUS

- Australia
- New Zealand
- United States

SEATO

- Australia
- France (until 1965)
- New Zealand
- Pakistan (until 1972)
- Philippines
- Thailand
- United Kingdom
- United States

EU

- United Kingdom
- Belgium
- France
- West Germany
- Italy
- Luxembourg
- Netherlands
- Denmark
- Ireland
- Greece
- Portugal
- Spain

Also Associated[

Imperial State of Iran (until **1979**)

Former Soviet: Post-Soviet states, all known as the Soviet Union or the former Soviet republics, are states that emerged from the unification of the Soviet Union in December 1991, and Russia was internationally represented as an allied state Soviet Union The three Baltic States first issued their Declaration of Independence between March and May 1990 and claimed continuity with the main governments that existed before the Soviet Union was isolated in 1940. 12 remaining republics subsequently exploded. Twelve of the 15 states, with the exception of the Baltic states, originally formed the CIS, most of them joining the CSTO, while the Baltic States focused on the EU and NATO.

There are several contradictory countries with different degrees of recognition in the territory of the former Soviet Union: Transnistria in eastern Moldova, Abkhazia and South Ossetia in northern Georgia, the Argentine Republic in the southwest of Azerbaijan. Since 2014, the People's Republic of Donetsk and the People's Republic of Luhansk

have declared independence in southeastern Ukraine. All this (with the exception of Argentina), with Russia's military and financial assistance, Arzov is very much in harmony with Armenia, which maintains close military cooperation with Russia. Also, before the dissolution of the Crimea by Russia from Ukraine in March 2014, which most of its countries do not recognize, it briefly announced its independence.

States and geographical groupings of former soviet

Baltic states	Central Asia	Eastern Europe	Eurasia	Transcaucasia
• Estonia • Latvia • Lithuania	• Kazakhstan • Kyrgyzstan • Tajikistan • Turkmenistan • Uzbekistan	• Belarus • Moldova • Ukraine	• Russia	• Armenia • Azerbaijan • Georgia

African: The African Economic Community (AEC) is an organization of African Union states establishing grounds for mutual economic development among the majority of African states. The stated goals of the organization include the creation of free trade areas, customs unions, a single market, a central bank, and a common currency (see African Monetary Union) thus establishing an economic and monetary union.

CEN-SAD	ECOWAS	COMESA	ECCAS
Founding states (1998): • Burkina Faso • Chad • Libya • Mali • Niger • Sudan **Joined later:** • 1999: Central African Republic • 1999: Eritrea • 2000: Djibouti • 2000: Gambia • 2000: Senegal • 2001: Egypt • 2001: Morocco • 2001: Nigeria • 2001: Somalia • 2001: Tunisia • 2002: Benin • 2002: Togo • 2004: Ivory Coast • 2004: Guinea-Bissau • 2004: Liberia • 2005: Ghana • 2005: Sierra Leone • 2007: Comoros	**Founding states (1975):** • Benin [UEMOA-94] • Burkina Faso [UEMOA-94] • Ivory Coast [UEMOA-94] • Gambia [WAMZ-00] • Ghana [WAMZ-00] • Guinea [WAMZ-00] • Guinea-Bissau [UEMOA-97] • Liberia [WAMZ-10] • Mali [UEMOA-94] • Niger [UEMOA-94] • Nigeria [WAMZ-00] • Senegal [UEMOA-94] • Sierra Leone [WAMZ-00] • Togo [UEMOA-94] **Joined later:** 1976: Cape Verde **Former members:** 1975-2002: Mauritania UEMOA-94: UEMOA state from 1994	**Founding states (1994):** • Burundi • Comoros • DR Congo • Djibouti • Eritrea • Ethiopia • Kenya • Madagascar • Malawi • Mauritius • Rwanda • Sudan • Swaziland • Uganda • Zambia • Zimbabwe **Joined later:** • 1999: Egypt • 2001: Seychelles • 2006: Libya 2011: South Sudan **Former members:** • 1994-1997: Lesotho • 1994-1997: Mozambique	**Founding states (1985):** • Burundi • Cameroon [CEMAC-99] • Central African Republic [CEMAC-99] • Chad [CEMAC-99] • Congo [CEMAC-99] • DR Congo • Equatorial Guinea [CEMAC-99] • Gabon [CEMAC-99] • Rwanda [withdrawn 2007[1]-2016[3]] • São Tomé and Príncipe **Joined later:** 1999: Angola CEMAC-99: CEMAC state from 1999 **EAC** **Founding states (2001):** • Kenya • Tanzania • Uganda **Joined later:** • 2007: Burundi

• 2007: 🇬🇳 Guinea	UEMOA-97: UEMOA state from 1997	• 1994-2000: 🇹🇿 Tanzania	• 2007: 🇷🇼 Rwanda
• 2008: 🇰🇪 Kenya		• 1994-2004: 🇳🇦 Namibia	2016: 🇸🇸 South Sudan
• 2008: 🇲🇷 Mauritania	WAMZ-00: WAMZ state from 2000	1994-2007: 🇦🇴 Angola[1][2]	
2008: 🇸🇹 São Tomé and Príncipe	WAMZ-10: WAMZ state		

Middle Eastern: The Eastern Bloc was the group of socialist states of Central and Eastern Europe, generally the Soviet Union and the countries of the Warsaw Pact. The terms Communist Bloc and Soviet Bloc were also used to denote groupings of states aligned with the Soviet Union, although these terms might include states outside.

The People's Republic of the Congo from 1969 The People's Republic of Angola from 1975 The People's Republic of Mozambique from 1975 The Derg/People's Democratic Republic of Ethiopia from 1974	The People's Democratic Republic of Yemen from 1967 The Democratic Republic of Afghanistan from 1978 The Mongolian People's Republic from 1924 The People's Republic of China until the Sino-Soviet split in 1961	The Democratic People's Republic of Korea from 1948 The Socialist Republic of Vietnam from 1945 The Lao People's Democratic Republic from 1975 The People's Republic of Kampuchea from 1979 The Somali Democratic Republic until the Ogaden War in 1977

Latin American: The integration of Latin America has a history going back to Spanish American and Brazilian independence, when there was discussion of creating a regional state or confederation of Latin American nations to protect the area's newly won autonomy. After several projects failed, the issue was not taken up again until the late nineteenth century, but now centered on the issue of international trade and with a sense of Pan-Americanism, owing to the United States of America taking a leading role in the project.

The idea of granting these organizations a primarily political purpose did not become prominent again until the post-World War II period, which saw both the start of the Cold War and a climate of international cooperation that led to the creation of institutions such as the United Nations. It would not be until the mid-twentieth century that uniquely Latin American organizations were created.

Country			
🇨🇦 Canada	🇯🇲 Jamaica	🇧🇲 Bermuda	🇬🇾 Guyana
🇺🇸 USA	🇰🇳 Saint Kitts and Nevis	🇻🇬 British Virgin Islands	🇭🇹 Haiti
🇲🇽 Mexico	🇻🇨 Saint Vincent and the Grenadines	🇰🇾 Cayman Islands	🇧🇴 Bolivia
🇬🇹 Guatemala	🇱🇨 Saint Lucia	🇹🇨 Turks and Caicos Islands	🇨🇱 Chile
🇸🇻 El Salvador	🇸🇷 Suriname	🇦🇼 Aruba	🇦🇬 Antigua and Barbuda
🇭🇳 Honduras	🇹🇹 Trinidad and Tobago	🇧🇶 Netherlands Antilles	🇦🇷 Argentina
🇳🇮 Nicaragua	🇲🇸 Montserrat	🇫🇷 France	🇺🇾 Uruguay
🇨🇷 Costa Rica	🇦🇮 Anguilla	🇵🇷 Puerto Rico	🇨🇴 Colombia
🇩🇴 Dominican Republic	🇧🇧 Barbados	🇻🇮 U.S. Virgin Islands	🇪🇨 Ecuador
🇵🇦 Panama	🇧🇸 Bahamas	🇧🇿 Belize	🇵🇪 Peru
🇨🇺 Cuba	🇵🇾 Paraguay	🇩🇲 Dominica	
🇻🇪 Venezuela	🇧🇷 Brazil	🇬🇩 Grenada	

Conclusion

Intervention in armed conflicts is full of riddles that await attention from scholars and policymakers. This book argues that rethinking intervention redefining what it is and why foreign powers take an interest in others' conflicts is of critical importance to understanding how conflicts evolve over time with the entry and exit of external actors. It does this by building a new model of intervention that crosses the traditional boundaries between economics, international relations theory, and security studies, and places the economic interests and domestic political institutions of external states at the center of intervention decisions.

Combining quantitative and qualitative evidence from both historical and contemporary conflicts, including interventions in both interstate conflicts and civil wars, it presents an in-depth discussion of a range of interventions diplomatic, economic, and military in a variety of international contexts, creating a comprehensive model for future research on the topic.

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